

## **Corporate Policy and Resources Committee**

14 June 2018

**Subject: Annual Report on the Treasury Management Service and Actual** Prudential and Treasury Indicators 2017/18

Report by: Strategic Finance and Business Support Manager (Deputy

S151)

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This annual treasury report is a requirement of the Purpose / Summary:

> Council's reporting procedures. It covers the treasury activity during 2017/18 and the actual Prudential

Indicators for 2017/18.

## **RECOMMENDATION(S):**

- 1 To accept the Annual Treasury Management Report for 2017/18 along with the actual Prudential and Treasury Indicators;
- 2 To recommend the above to Council for approval.

## **IMPLICATIONS**

Legal: None arising as a result of this report.								
Financial: FIN/54/18/TJB None aris	ing from	this repor	t.					
Staffing: None arising as a result of	this repo	rt.						
Equality and Diversity including H	uman Ri	ights: No	ne arising as a	a result	of this report.			
Risk Assessment: This is a monitor	ing repoi	rt only.						
Climate Related Risks and Opport	unities:	This is a r	nonitoring rep	ort only	<b>y</b> .			
Title and Location of any Backgrou	ınd Pan	are usad	in the prepar	ration (	of this report:			
None.	ина г ар	cio doca	iii tile propul	ation	or tino report.			
Call in and Urgency:								
Is the decision one which Rule 14.	7 of the	Scrutiny	Procedure R	ules a	pply?			
i.e. is the report exempt from being Yes called in due to urgency (in consultation with C&I chairman)								
Key Decision:								
A matter which affects two or more Yes wards, or has significant financial implications								

## **Annual Treasury Management Report 2017/18**

## **Purpose**

This Council is required by regulations issued under the Local Government Act 2003 to produce an annual treasury management review of activities and the actual prudential and treasury indicators for 2017/18. This report meets the requirements of both the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management, (the Code), and the CIPFA Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities, (the Prudential Code).

During 2017/18 the minimum reporting requirements were that the full Council should receive the following reports:

- an annual treasury strategy in advance of the year (Council March2017)
- a mid-year, (minimum), treasury update report (Corporate Policy and Resources Committee November 2017)
- an annual review following the end of the year describing the activity compared to the strategy, (this report)

In addition, the Corporate Policy and Resources Committee has received quarterly treasury management update reports.

The regulatory environment places responsibility on members for the review and scrutiny of treasury management policy and activities. This report is, therefore, important in that respect, as it provides details of the outturn position for treasury activities and highlights compliance with the Council's policies previously approved by members.

This Council confirms that it has complied with the requirement under the Code to give prior scrutiny to all of the above treasury management reports by the Governance and Audit Committee for the annual Treasury strategy and the Mid-Year and Annual Review by the Corporate Policy and Resources Committee before they were reported to the full Council. Member training on treasury management issues was undertaken during the year in January 2018 in order to support members' scrutiny role.

## **Executive Summary**

During 2017/18, the Council complied with its legislative and regulatory requirements. The key actual prudential and treasury indicators detailing the impact of capital expenditure activities during the year, with comparators, are as follows:

Prudential and treasury indicators	2016/17 Actual £000	2017/18 Original Budget £000	2017/18 Actual £000
Capital expenditure	2,584	20,130	6,534
Capital Financing Requirement:	1,219	18,632	4,714
Gross borrowing (External)	0	14,527	0
Finance Lease	128	122	32
Investments     Longer than 1 year     Under 1 year     Total	2,000 16,600 18,600	2,000 7,533 9,533	3,000 12,200 15,200
Net borrowing	(18,472)	5,116	(15,168)

The capital programme saw a significant re-profiling of the 2017/18 budgets to future years for schemes which are being delivered over the medium term.

Other prudential and treasury indicators are to be found in the main body of this report.

The Director of Resources also confirms that prudential borrowing was only undertaken for a capital purpose, however no external borrowing has been undertaken, as the Council utilises available cash balances at this time, and the statutory borrowing limit, (the Authorised Limit), was not breached.

The financial year 2017/18 continued the challenging investment environment of previous years, namely low investment returns.

## Introduction and Background

This report summarises the following:-

- Capital activity during the year;
- Impact of this activity on the Council's underlying indebtedness, (the Capital Financing Requirement);
- The actual prudential and treasury indicators;
- Overall treasury position identifying how the Council has borrowed in relation to this indebtedness, and the impact on investment balances;
- · Summary of interest rate movements in the year;
- Detailed debt activity; and
- Detailed investment activity.

## 1. The Council's Capital Expenditure and Financing 2017/18

The Council undertakes capital expenditure on long-term assets. These activities may either be:

- Financed immediately through the application of capital or revenue resources (capital receipts, capital grants, revenue contributions etc.), which has no resultant impact on the Council's borrowing need; or
- If insufficient financing is available, or a decision is taken not to apply resources, the capital expenditure will give rise to a borrowing need.

The actual capital expenditure forms one of the required prudential indicators. The table below shows the actual capital expenditure and how this was financed.

£m General Fund	2016/17 Actual £000's	2017/18 Revised Budget £000's	2017/18 Actual £000's
Capital expenditure	2,584	12,719	6,534
Financed in year by:			
Capital Receipts	405	905	344
Capital grants/Contributions	660	1,786	634
Revenue	1,484	2,095	1,786
Leases	0	0	0
S106	0	158	160
Prudential Borrowing	35	7,775	3,610

## 2. The Council's Overall Borrowing Need

The Council's underlying need to borrow for capital expenditure is termed the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). This figure is a gauge of the Council's indebtedness. The CFR results from the capital activity of the Council and resources used to pay for the capital spend. It represents the 2017/18 unfinanced capital expenditure (see above table), and prior years' net or unfinanced capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for by revenue or other resources.

Part of the Council's treasury activities is to address the funding requirements for this borrowing need. Depending on the capital expenditure programme, the treasury service organises the Council's cash position to ensure that sufficient cash is available to meet the capital plans and cash flow requirements. This may be sourced through borrowing from external bodies, (such as the Government, through the Public Works Loan Board [PWLB] or the money markets), or utilising temporary cash resources within the Council.

**Reducing the CFR** – the Council's underlying borrowing need (CFR) is not allowed to rise indefinitely. Statutory controls are in place to ensure that capital assets are broadly charged to revenue over the life of the asset. The Council is required to make an annual revenue charge, called the Minimum Revenue Provision – MRP, to reduce the CFR. This is effectively a repayment of the borrowing need. This differs from the treasury management arrangements which ensure that cash is available to meet capital commitments. External debt can also be borrowed or repaid at any time, but this does not change the CFR.

The total CFR can also be reduced by:

- the application of additional capital financing resources, (such as unapplied capital receipts); or
- charging more than the statutory revenue charge (MRP) each year through a Voluntary Revenue Provision (VRP).

The Council's 2017/18 MRP Policy, (as required by MHCLG Guidance), was approved as part of the Treasury Management Strategy Report for 2017/18 in March 2017.

The Council's CFR for the year is shown below, and represents a key prudential indicator. It includes leasing schemes on the balance sheet, which increase the Council's borrowing need. No borrowing is actually required against these schemes as a borrowing facility is included in the contract.

CFR General Fund	31 March 2017 Actual £000's	31 March 2018 Revised Budget £000's	31 March 2018 Actual £000's
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CFR General Fund	31 March 2017 Actual £000's	31 March 2018 Revised Budget £000's	31 March 2018 Actual £000's
Opening balance	1,407	1,219	1,219
Add adjustment for the inclusion of on-balance sheet leasing arrangements and Prudential Borrowing	35	7,775	3,610
Less MRP/Finance Lease Repayments	(223)	(221)	(114)
Closing balance	1,219	8,773	4,715

Borrowing activity is constrained by prudential indicators for net borrowing and the CFR, and by the authorised limit.

Gross borrowing and the CFR - in order to ensure that borrowing levels are prudent over the medium term and only for a capital purpose, the Council should ensure that its gross external borrowing does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the capital financing requirement in the preceding year (2016/17) plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current (2017/18) and next two financial years. This essentially means that the Council is not borrowing to support revenue expenditure. This indicator allowed the Council some flexibility to borrow in advance of its immediate capital needs in 2017/18. The table below highlights the Council's gross borrowing position against the CFR. The Council has complied with this prudential indicator.

	31 March 2017 Actual £000's	31 March 2018 Budget £000's	31 March 2018 Actual £000's
Prudential borrowing position	£350	£7,775	£3,610
CFR	£1,219	£8,773m	£4,715

**The authorised limit** - the authorised limit is the "affordable borrowing limit" required by s3 of the Local Government Act 2003. Once this has been set, the Council does not have the power to borrow above this level. The table below demonstrates that during 2017/18 the Council has maintained gross borrowing within its authorised limit.

**The operational boundary** – the operational boundary is the expected borrowing position of the Council during the year. Periods where the actual position is either below or over the boundary are acceptable subject to the authorised limit not being breached.

Actual financing costs as a proportion of net revenue stream - this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

	2017/18 £000's
Authorised limit	£31,680
Maximum gross borrowing position	£46,011
Operational boundary	£9,000
Average gross external borrowing position	£0
Financing costs as a proportion of net revenue stream	0.06%

• Treasury Position as at 31 March 2018

The Council's debt and investment position is organised by the treasury management service in order to ensure adequate liquidity for revenue and capital activities, security for investments and to manage risks within all treasury management activities. Procedures and controls to achieve these objectives are well established both through member reporting detailed in the summary, and through officer activity detailed in the Council's Treasury Management Practices. At the end of 2017/18 the Council's treasury, (excluding borrowing by finance leases), position was as follows:

TABLE 1	31 March 2017 Principal £000's	Rate/ Return	Average Life yrs	31 March 2018 Principal £000's	Rate/ Return	Average Life yrs
Total debt	0	0%			0%	
CFR	1,224			4,715		
Finance Lease Liabilities	128			32		
Over / (-)under borrowing	-1,096			-4,683		
Investments:						
- in house	18,600	1.59%		15,200	1.21%	
Total investments	18,600			15,200	1.21%	

	31 March 2017 Actual	2017/18 Original Limits	31 March 2018 Actual
Ratio of Financing Costs to Net revenue Stream	1.27%	5.99%	0.06%
Increase/Reduction (-) in Council Tax (band change per annum)	-£1.44	-£10.62	£1.96

The maturity structure of the investment portfolio was as follows:

	2016/17 Actual £000's	2017/18 Budget £000's	31 March 2018 Actual £000's
Investments Less than 1 year More than 5 years Total	16,635	9,533	12,207
	2,183	3,000	3,272
	<b>18,818</b>	<b>12,933</b>	<b>15,479</b>

## Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns remained low during 2017/18 but were on a gently rising trend in the second half of the year.
- The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the year. However, this was kept under review to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when this authority may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure.
- A cost of carry remained during the year on any new long-term borrowing as it would have caused a temporary increase in cash balances which would have incurred a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

#### **Borrowing strategy**

The Council maintained an under-borrowed position. This meant that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), was not fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow was used as a temporary measure. This strategy was prudent as investment returns were low and counterparty risk was still an issue that needed to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution was adopted with the treasury operations. The Director of Resources therefore monitored interest rates in financial markets and adopted a pragmatic strategy based upon the following principles to manage interest rate risks.

 As it was not felt that there would be a significant risk of a sharp rise in long and short term rates, long term borrowings have been postponed however the situation is appraised as we incur more capital expenditure. The exposure to fixed and variable rates was as follows:

	31 March 2017 Actual	2017/18 Original Limits	31 March 2018 Actual
Fixed rate (principal or interest) based on net debt	100%	100%	100%
Variable rate (principal or interest) based on net debt	75%	75%	75%

## 3. The Strategy for 2017/18

The expectation for interest rates within the treasury management strategy for 2017/18 anticipated that Bank Rate would not start rising from 0.25% until quarter 2 2019 and then only increase once more before 31.3.2020. There would also be gradual rises in medium and longer term fixed borrowing rates during 2017/18 and the two subsequent financial years. Variable, or short-term rates, were expected to be the cheaper form of borrowing over the period. Continued uncertainty in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis promoted a cautious approach, whereby investments would continue to be dominated by low counterparty risk considerations, resulting in relatively low returns compared to borrowing rates.

In this scenario, the treasury strategy was to postpone borrowing to avoid the cost of holding higher levels of investments and to reduce counterparty risk.

During 2017/18, longer term PWLB rates were volatile but with little overall direction, whereas shorter term PWLB rates were on a rising trend during the second half of the year.

#### 4. The Economy and Interest Rates

**UK.** The outcome of the EU referendum in June 2016 resulted in a gloomy outlook and economic forecasts from the Bank of England based around an expectation of a major slowdown in UK GDP growth, particularly during the second half of 2016, which was expected to push back the first increase in Bank Rate for at least three years. Consequently, the Bank responded in August 2016 by cutting Bank Rate by 0.25% to 0.25% and making available over £100bn of cheap financing to the banking sector up to February 2018. Both measures were intended to stimulate growth in the economy. This gloom was overdone as the UK economy turned in a G7 leading growth rate of **1.8% in 2016**, (actually joint equal with Germany), and followed it up with another **1.8% in 2017**, (although this was a comparatively weak result compared to the US and EZ).

During the calendar year of 2017, there was a major shift in expectations in financial markets in terms of how soon Bank Rate would start on a rising trend. After the UK

economy surprised on the upside with strong growth in the second half of 2016, growth in 2017 was disappointingly weak in the first half of the year; quarter 1 came in at +0.3% (+1.7% y/y) and quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y), which meant that growth in the first half of 2017 was the slowest for the first half of any year since 2012. The main reason for this was the sharp increase in inflation caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases into the cost of imports into the economy. This caused a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power as inflation exceeded average wage increases. Consequently, the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 75% of GDP, saw weak growth as consumers responded by cutting back on their expenditure. However, growth did pick up in quarter 3 to 0.5% before dipping slightly to 0.4% in quarter 4.

Consequently, market expectations during the autumn rose significantly that the MPC would be heading in the direction of imminently raising Bank Rate. The MPC meeting of 14 September provided a shock to the markets with a sharp increase in tone in the minutes where the MPC considerably hardened their wording in terms of needing to raise Bank Rate very soon. The 2 November MPC quarterly **Inflation Report meeting** duly delivered on this warning by withdrawing the 0.25% emergency rate cut which had been implemented in August 2016. Market debate then moved on as to whether this would be a one and done move for maybe a year or more by the MPC, or the first of a series of increases in Bank Rate over the next 2-3 years. The MPC minutes from that meeting were viewed as being dovish, i.e. there was now little pressure to raise rates by much over that time period. In particular, the GDP growth forecasts were pessimistically weak while there was little evidence of building pressure on wage increases despite remarkably low unemployment. The MPC forecast that CPI would peak at about 3.1% and chose to look through that breaching of its 2% target as this was a one off result of the devaluation of sterling caused by the result of the EU referendum. The inflation forecast showed that the MPC expected inflation to come down to near the 2% target over the two to three year time horizon. So this all seemed to add up to cooling expectations of much further action to raise Bank Rate over the next two years.

However, GDP growth in the second half of 2017 came in stronger than expected, while in the new year there was evidence that wage increases had started to rise. The **8 February MPC meeting** minutes therefore revealed another sharp hardening in MPC warnings focusing on a reduction in spare capacity in the economy, weak increases in productivity, higher GDP growth forecasts and a shift of their time horizon to focus on the 18-24 month period for seeing inflation come down to 2%. (CPI inflation ended the year at 2.7% but was forecast to still be just over 2% within two years.) This resulted in a marked increase in expectations that there would be another Bank Rate increase in May 2018 and a bringing forward of the timing of subsequent increases in Bank Rate. This shift in market expectations resulted in **investment rates** from 3-12 months increasing sharply during the spring quarter.

**PWLB borrowing rates** increased correspondingly to the above developments with the shorter term rates increasing more sharply than longer term rates. In addition, UK gilts have moved in a relatively narrow band this year, (within 25 bps

for much of the year), compared to **US treasuries**. During the second half of the year, there was a noticeable trend in treasury yields being on a rising trend with the Fed raising rates by 0.25% in June, December and March, making six increases in all from the floor. The effect of these three increases was greater in shorter terms around 5 year, rather than longer term yields.

As for **equity markets**, the FTSE 100 hit a new peak near to 7,800 in early January before there was a sharp selloff in a number of stages during the spring, replicating similar developments in US equity markets.

The major UK landmark event of the year was the inconclusive result of the **general election** on 8 June. However, this had relatively little impact on financial markets. However, **sterling** did suffer a sharp devaluation against most other currencies, although it has recovered about half of that fall since then. Brexit negotiations have been a focus of much attention and concern during the year but so far, there has been little significant hold up to making progress.

The **manufacturing sector** has been the bright spot in the economy, seeing stronger growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year. However, the manufacturing sector only accounts for around 11% of GDP so expansion in this sector has a much more muted effect on the average total GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

**EU.** Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), was lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of quantitative easing to stimulate growth. However, growth eventually picked up in 2016 and subsequently gathered further momentum to produce an overall GDP figure for 2017 of 2.3%. Nevertheless, despite providing this massive monetary stimulus, the ECB is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in March, inflation was still only 1.4%. It is, therefore, unlikely to start an upswing in rates until possibly towards the end of 2019.

**USA.** Growth in the American economy was volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 followed that path again with quarter 1 at 1.2%, quarter 2 3.1%, quarter 3 3.2% and quarter 4 2.9%. The annual rate of GDP growth for 2017 was 2.3%, up from 1.6% in 2016. Unemployment in the US also fell to the lowest level for 17 years, reaching 4.1% in October to February, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has been the first major western central bank to start on an upswing in rates with six increases since the first one in December 2015 to lift the central rate to 1.50 - 1.75% in March 2018. There could be a further two or three increases in 2018 as the Fed faces a challenging situation with GDP growth trending upwards at a time when the recent Trump fiscal stimulus is likely to increase growth further, consequently increasing inflationary pressures in an economy which is already operating at near full capacity. In October 2017, the Fed also became the first major western central bank to make a start on unwinding quantitative easing by phasing in a gradual reduction in reinvesting maturing debt.

**Chinese economic growth** has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus and medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

**Japan.** GDP growth has been improving to reach an annual figure of 2.1% in quarter 4 of 2017. However, it is still struggling to get inflation up to its target rate of 2% despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus, although inflation has risen in 2018 to reach 1.5% in February. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Graphs showing growth and inflation are contained at appendix 1.


## 5. Borrowing Rates in 2017/18

## PWLB certainty maturity borrowing rates

As depicted in the graph and tables below and in appendix 2, PWLB 25 and 50 year rates have been volatile during the year with little consistent trend. However, shorter rates were on a rising trend during the second half of the year and reached peaks in February / March.

During the year, the 50 year PWLB target (certainty) rate for new long term borrowing was 2.50% in quarters 1 and 3 and 2.60% in quarters 2 and 4.


The graphs and tables for PWLB rates show, for a selection of maturity periods, the average borrowing rates, the high and low points in rates, spreads and individual rates at the start and the end of the financial year.



#### 6. Investment Rates in 2017/18

Investment rates for 3 months and longer have been on a rising trend during the second half of the year in the expectation of Bank Rate increasing from its floor of 0.25%, and reached a peak at the end of March.

Bank Rate was duly raised from 0.25% to 0.50% on 2.11.17 and remained at that level for the rest of the year. However, further increases are expected over the next few years. Deposit rates continued into the start of 2017/18 at previous depressed levels due, in part, to a large tranche of cheap financing being made available under the Term Funding Scheme to the banking sector by the Bank of England; this facility ended on 28.2.18.



## 7. Investment Outturn for 2017/18

**Investment Policy** – the Council's investment policy is governed by MHCLG investment guidance, which has been implemented in the annual investment strategy approved by the Council in March 2017. This policy sets out the approach for choosing investment counterparties, and is based on credit ratings provided by the three main credit rating agencies, supplemented by additional market data, (such as rating outlooks, credit default swaps, bank share prices etc.).

The investment activity during the year conformed to the approved strategy, and the Council had no liquidity difficulties. However, there was one breach where the approved maximum amount invested (£2m) was exceeded by £0.5m. Funds were not considered at risk and have been returned including interest earned.

**Resources** – the Council's cash balances comprise revenue and capital resources and cash flow monies. The Council's core cash resources comprised as follows:

Balance Sheet Resources	31 March 2017 £000's	31 March 2018 £000's
Balances	4,838	3,914
Earmarked reserves	13,334	12,635
Provisions	928	935
Usable capital receipts	2,896	3,016
Total	21,996	20,500

**Investments held by the Council** - the Council maintained an average balance of £21.288m of internally managed funds. The internally managed funds earned an average rate of return of 1.215%. The comparable performance indicator is the average 7-day LIBID rate, which was 0.21%. This compares with a budget assumption of £21m investment balances earning an average rate of 1%.

#### 8. Other Issues

#### 1. Revised CIPFA Codes

In December 2017, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, (CIPFA), issued a revised Treasury Management Code and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes, and a revised Prudential Code.

A particular focus of these revised codes was how to deal with local authority investments which are not treasury type investments e.g. by investing in purchasing property in order to generate income for the Authority at a much higher level than can be attained by treasury investments. One recommendation was that local authorities should produce a new report to members to give a high level summary of the overall capital strategy and to enable members to see how the cash resources of the Authority have been apportioned between treasury and non-treasury investments.

Based on the latest guidance and new Codes, officers reported to members in March 2018, as part of the Medium Term Financial Plan which contained within the Capital Investment Strategy the strategy for Non-Treasury Investments, ie investments in Commercial Properties, in addition reference was made in the Treasury Management Strategy and MRP Policy for 2018/19 onwards


## 2. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II)

The EU set the date of 3 January 2018 for the introduction of regulations under MIFID II. These regulations govern the relationship that financial institutions

conducting lending and borrowing transactions will have with local authorities from that date. This has had little effect on this Authority apart from having to fill in forms sent by each institution dealing with this Authority and for each type of investment instrument we use, apart from for cash deposits with banks and building societies.

# Appendix 1: Graphs

## UK, US and EZ GDP growth




#### Inflation UK, US, Germany and France



## Appendix 2: Borrowing and investment rates

Please find below supplementary graphs and tables which clients may wish to use. The PWLB rates are based on the maturity debt certainty rate.



									1 month
	1	1-1.5	2.5-3	3.5-4	4.5-5	9.5-10	24.5-25	49.5-50	variable
3/4/17	0.850%	0.870%	1.000%	1.120%	1.250%	1.930%	2.620%	2.370%	1.100%
29/3/18	1.470%	1.520%	1.670%	1.760%	1.850%	2.230%	2.570%	2.290%	1.090%
High	1.510%	1.600%	1.790%	1.900%	2.010%	2.530%	2.930%	2.640%	1.310%
Low	0.800%	0.820%	0.940%	1.030%	1.140%	1.780%	2.520%	2.250%	1.040%
Average	1.107%	1.143%	1.276%	1.384%	1.503%	2.083%	2.688%	2.415%	1.157%
Spread	0.710%	0.780%	0.850%	0.870%	0.870%	0.750%	0.410%	0.390%	0.270%
High date	21/03/2018	21/03/2018	21/03/2018	21/03/2018	15/02/2018	15/02/2018	15/02/2018	15/02/2018	21/03/2018
Low date	03/05/2017	03/05/2017	30/05/2017	15/06/2017	15/06/2017	15/06/2017	08/09/2017	08/09/2017	04/04/2017

	1 Year	5 Year	10 Year	25 Year	50 Year
1/4/17	0.85%	1.25%	1.93%	2.62%	2.37%
31/3/18	1.47%	1.85%	2.23%	2.57%	2.29%
Low	0.80%	1.14%	1.78%	2.52%	2.25%
Date	03/05/2017	15/06/2017	15/06/2017	08/09/2017	08/09/2017
High	1.51%	2.01%	2.53%	2.93%	2.64%
Date	21/03/2018	15/02/2018	15/02/2018	15/02/2018	15/02/2018
Average	1.11%	1.50%	2.08%	2.69%	2.41%

# Money market investment rates 2017/18

	7 day	1 month	3 month	6 month	1 year
1/4/17	0.111	0.132	0.212	0.366	0.593
31/3/18	0.364	0.386	0.587	0.704	0.878
High	0.366	0.390	0.587	0.704	0.879
Low	0.099	0.122	0.140	0.273	0.461
Average	0.215	0.233	0.286	0.401	0.606
Spread	0.267	0.268	0.447	0.432	0.418
High date	27/2/18	22/3/18	29/3/18	29/3/18	28/3/18
Low date	4/7/17	10/8/17	7/8/17	7/9/17	6/9/17

## **APPENDIX 3 - ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT**

This is an optional area which clients may wish to include in their report if they feel that members would appreciate having this list of abbreviations and definitions.

**ALMO:** an Arm's Length Management Organisation is a not-for-profit company that provides housing services on behalf of a local authority. Usually an ALMO is set up by the authority to manage and improve all or part of its housing stock.

**LAS:** Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions – the council's treasury management advisers.

**CE**: Capital Economics - is the economics consultancy that provides Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions, with independent economic forecasts, briefings and research.

**CFR:** capital financing requirement - the council's annual underlying borrowing need to finance capital expenditure and a measure of the council's total outstanding indebtedness.

**CIPFA:** Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy – the professional accounting body that oversees and sets standards in local authority finance and treasury management.

**CPI:** consumer price inflation – the official measure of inflation adopted as a common standard by countries in the EU. It is a measure that examines the weighted average of prices of a basket of consumer goods and services, such as transportation, food and medical care. It is calculated by taking price changes for each item in the predetermined basket of goods and averaging them.

**ECB**: European Central Bank - the central bank for the Eurozone

**EU:** European Union

**EZ**: Eurozone -those countries in the EU which use the euro as their currency

**Fed** The Federal Reserve, often referred to simply as "the Fed," is the central bank of the United States. It was created by the Congress to provide the nation with a stable monetary and financial system.

**FOMC:** the Federal Open Market Committee – this is the branch of the Federal Reserve Board which determines monetary policy in the USA by setting interest rates and determining quantitative easing policy. It is composed of 12 members—the seven members of the Board of Governors and five of the 12 Reserve Bank presidents.

**GDP:** gross domestic product – a measure of the growth and total size of the economy.

**G7:** the group of seven countries that form an informal bloc of industrialised democracies--the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the

United Kingdom--that meets annually to discuss issues such as global economic governance, international security, and energy policy.

**Gilts:** gilts are bonds issued by the UK Government to borrow money on the financial markets. Interest paid by the Government on gilts is called a yield and is at a rate that is fixed for the duration until maturity of the gilt, (unless a gilt is index linked to inflation); yields therefore change inversely to the price of gilts i.e. a rise in the price of a gilt will mean that its yield will fall.

**HRA:** housing revenue account.

**IMF:** International Monetary Fund - the lender of last resort for national governments which get into financial difficulties.

**LIBID:** the London Interbank Bid Rate is a bid rate; the rate bid by banks on deposits i.e., the rate at which a bank is willing to borrow from other banks. It is the "other end" of the LIBOR (an offered, hence "ask" rate, the rate at which a bank will lend).

**MHCLG:** the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government -the Government department that directs local authorities in England.

**MPC:** the Monetary Policy Committee is a committee of the Bank of England, which meets for one and a half days, eight times a year, to determine monetary policy by setting the official interest rate in the United Kingdom, (the Bank of England Base Rate, commonly called Bank Rate), and by making decisions on quantitative easing.

**MRP:** minimum revenue provision -a statutory annual minimum revenue charge to reduce the total outstanding CFR, (the total indebtedness of a local authority).

**PFI:** Private Finance Initiative – capital expenditure financed by the private sector i.e. not by direct borrowing by a local authority.

**PWLB:** Public Works Loan Board – this is the part of H.M. Treasury which provides loans to local authorities to finance capital expenditure.

**QE:** quantitative easing – is an unconventional form of monetary policy where a central bank creates new money electronically to buy financial assets, like government bonds, (but may also include corporate bonds). This process aims to stimulate economic growth through increased private sector spending in the economy and also aims to return inflation to target. These purchases increase the supply of liquidity to the economy; this policy is employed when lowering interest rates has failed to stimulate economic growth to an acceptable level and to lift inflation to target. Once QE has achieved its objectives of stimulating growth and inflation, QE will be reversed by selling the bonds the central bank had previously purchased, or by not replacing debt that it held which matures. The aim of this reversal is to ensure that inflation does not exceed its target once the economy recovers from a sustained period of depressed growth and inflation. Economic

growth, and increases in inflation, may threaten to gather too much momentum if action is not taken to 'cool' the economy.

**RPI**: the Retail Price Index is a measure of inflation that measures the change in the cost of a representative sample of retail goods and services. It was the UK standard for measurement of inflation until the UK changed to using the EU standard measure of inflation – CPI. The main difference between RPI and CPI is in the way that housing costs are treated. RPI is often higher than CPI for that reason.

**TMSS:** the annual treasury management strategy statement report that all local authorities are required to submit for approval by the full council before the start of each financial year.

**VRP:** a voluntary revenue provision to repay debt, in the annual budget, which is additional to the annual MRP charge, (see above definition).